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In the Supreme Court
o f the State o f Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
In the interest of
Terry G. a person
\ Case No. 13728
under 18 years of age.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from an order in the District Juvenile Court
for Cache County by the Honorable Charles E.
Bradford, Juvenile Court Judge.
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In the Supreme Court
o f the State o f Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
In the interest of
Terry G., a person
under 18 years of age.

oase iNo. 10160

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order terminating
the parental rights of Hilda Gullett, appellant, to her
minor son, Terry Gullett, pursuant to Section 55—10—
109 UCA 1953, as amended, in the District Juvenile
Court For Cache County, State of Utah, before the
Honorable Charles E. Bradford, Juvenile Court Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks the reversal of the order and
the dismissal of the petition to terminate the natural
mother's parental rights or, in the alternative, a
remand to the lower court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant is the natural mother of Terry
Gullett, a minor male born May 28, 1971, who has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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resided continuously with the appellant until April 27,
1973, when a incident occurred which precipitated this
case. On the day in question, the appellant asked
Patty Creger, a 14—year—old girl who had previously
babysat for her, to tend Terry at the appellant's home.
Miss Creger agreed and both she and the appellant
attempted to contact her mother to inform her of Miss
Creger's whereabouts (p. 73). As Miss Creger's
mother was not home, they proceeded to the appellant's home, where Miss Creger and the child \KSS
left. A short time later, using a neighbor's phone, Miss
Creger called her mother to tell he where she was (p.
74). Her mother advised Patty that she was not to
babysit at appellant's home and that she was to
abandon the child which Miss Creger refused to do (pp.
74& 84). Miss Creger's mother called Mr. Morgan, a
social worker for the Division of Family Services in
Cache County, who told Miss Creger to call the police
which she refused (p. 75). A short time later, a friend
of Miss Creger arrived and together they called the
police who arrived a short time later and took the child
with the babysitter to a shelter home.
The appellant upon returning home later that
evening found that Terry had been removed from the
home and, after contacting Miss Creger's mother and
the police was informed that her child was being held
in shelter care.
A petition was then filed by the Division of Family
Services in Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appellant's parental rights to the said Terry Gullett
upon four grounds, to—wit: (1) she had not acquired
the necessary skills to properly supervise and train
said child; (2) her housekeeping standards were so
poor as to seriously jeopardize said child's physical and
emotional health; (3) her moral standards were so low
as to be a serious and damaging influence upon the
morals and welfare of said child; and (4) she had left
said child unattended or improperly attended.
A trial was held on June 18 and 19,1973, at which
time, the Juvenile Court Judge entered an order
terminating the parental rights of the appellant to the
child finding the first three allegations to be true and
the fourth not true (p. 315). The court did not recite
the specific testimony or facts upon which he found
these allegations to be true but stated that even
though finding these allegations to be true this did not
necessarily require the appellant's parental rights be
terminated (p. 315). He then ordered the termination
because appellant had not shown a change from the
conditions which caused her other children to be taken
from her and, therefore, ruled there was no reasonable
prospects that Terry's future would be brighter than
the rest of the family's, and ordered the child to be
placed for adoption(p. 321). After the conclusion of the
hearing and after the attornies representing the State
and the child,* appellant had left the Court room, the
Judge reconsidered the order based on the extreme
emotional condition of the appellant m& withdrew the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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order and continued the matter for further disposition
in six months with the appellant given specific
requirements and conditions to be met prior to and
during Terry's return to her summarized as follows:
(p. 327).
(1) All other persons living either permanently or
temporarily at the home were to leave.
(2) She was not to entertain men under inappropriate circumstances such as sleeping with her or
engage in any kind of sexual activity at any time Terry
was there.
(3) She was to live a good moral life as established
by Utah law and community standards.
(4) She was not to maintain any condition or
situation in the apartment that could be physically,
morally or emotionally hazardous to Terry.
(5) She was to keep the apartment reasonably
clean and tidy.
(6) When Terry was returned, she was to spend
as much time as possible with him and when gone, she
is to use a competent babysitter preferably in the
family home.
During this period, custody of Terry was to
remain with Division of Family Services even when
Terry was returned to the appellant. The Division of
Family Services was ordered to provide all appropriate
support services that may be indicated for Mrs.
Gullett and give her every opportunity to learn good
housekeeping practices, good parental practices, not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
to the extent of overriding her, but to provide what
she might need to assist her in making the changes in
her life that would be necessary for her to justify
A second hearing was held on January 25, 1974, at
which time the Division of Family Services
acknowledgedit had done nothing to assist appellant
to meet the conditions as set forth by the Court (p.
397) and expressed hostility and prejudice towards the
appellant and her attorney for the change in the order
which they thought was obtained by unethical conduct
by the appellant's attorney, (p. 388—89).
The Court found that the appellant had made
some superficial changes in her habits and lifestyle but
had shown no significant motivation to render herself
fit to provide for the child. The Court further found
that the child prospered in the current home and
would likely suffer serious regression if returned to
the natural mother and the termination order was
entered.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. DID THE LOWER COURT ERROR IN
RELYING ON JUDICIAL ACTIONS WITHOUT
PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THESE ACTIONS
WERE BASED AS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR
HIS ORDER OF TERMINATION?
2. IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON
THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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THE COURT WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF
THE TERMINATION ORDER?
3. DID THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF THE
COURT AND THE PURPOSES OF THE JUVENILE
COURT ACT IN FAILING TO ASSIST THE APPELLANT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SET
FORTH BY THE COURT SO THAT TERRY COULD
BE RETURNED TO HIS MOTHER?
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1
THE
COURT
BELOW
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE
RESULTS OF JUDICIAL ACTIONS WITHOUT
PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THESE ACTIONS
WERE BASED AS A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR
HIS ORDER OF TERMINATION.
In two leading Utah cases involving Juvenile
Court proceedings on petitions to terminate parental
rights, the Supreme Court has reviewed the appropriateness of the Juvenile Court in considering
matters which were not properly evidence before the
Court and found such action as reversible error. In
Fronk v. State 7 Utah 2d. 245, 322 P. 397 (1958), the
Juvenile Court Judge took judicial notice of the findings of the District Court in a divorce action upon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which no evidence was introduced at the Juvenile Court
hearing. In State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P. 2d
395 (1970), the Juvenile Court Judge relied on a trial
and conviction of the natural mother which occured
after the Juvenile Court hearing and a social file,
neither of which were properly introduced as
evidence.
At the time of the initial hearing on the petition to
terminate the parental rights, Judge L. Roland Anderson, Juvenile Court Judge, suggested he not hear
the matter because of prior matters he had heard
involving the appellant (p. 1), and upon the motion of
appellant's attorney, withdrew as the Judge and
transferred the matter to Judge Charles E. Bradford.
At the beginning of the hearing before Judge Bradford, Attorney Zollinger representing the State,
moved the Court to consider testimony given at a
hearing involving other children of appellant (p. 14).
The Court correctly ruled that those records were not
admissable because he wanted to know what the
situation was at the present time and how it applied to
the child in question. During the hearing, the same
question was again raised and the Court ruled the
prior conduct of appellant was too remote(p. 68).
During the hearing, it was admitted by the appellant
that custody in many of her children had been involuntarily taken from her but there was absolutely no
evidence on when, where, why and what this involuntary change in custody involved. The Court,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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without stating the specific facts upon which he made
his findings, found the first three allegations "substantially" proven and stated on pages 315 and 316.
u

Now, by finding these first three true
doesn't necessarily require that I terminate the
parental rights. I think the facts of the
allegations are basically shown. What I've been
listening for, frankly, and what 1 had expected
really to hear on Mrs. Gullett's part is some sort
of evidence, some sort of showing that
whatever the many difficiencies may have been
resulted in having all of these other children
taken away from her have been changed.
There's been a material change in circumstances. So that we could have some
resonable expectation that Terry's future
would or his prospects would be brighter than
the rest of the famlies."
The Court further stated at page 321:
"I realize that a person can change I even
realize that a person can change late in life, but
I don't see evidence of the kind of changes
most recently in Mrs. Gullett's life that would
indicate a real recognition that she needs to
change or a willigness to set aside her own
personal feelings and desires to make the
sacrifice, to pay the price to do the extremely
difficult job of being both mother and father to
this little boy. To see that he gets the entire
upbringing that her other children didn't have.
Now, I don't, 1 haven't reviewed the evidentuary record as far as the other children are
concerned, but 1 am obliged to take judicial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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notice of the Court's own records, I can only
assume that the Court had just cause to remove
the other children from the home, and there are
some children that she has mentioned that she
had given birth to that are not with her and
their removal from the home has not been
voluntary thing who were not mentioned in the
Court's records.
I don't know the circumstances and that to make my findings in
respect to those other than what evidence is in
the record and her testimony that they were
removed other than a voluntary basis."
After attorney for the appellant responded to the
Court's order by pointing out from his personal
recollection as her attorney of the substantial changes
in the appellant's conduct since the last hearing (pp.
322—324), the Court responded by acknowledging his
lack of information on what had happened to cause the
actions on which he was now basing his decision (p.
324).
The trial Court errored in basing his decision on
assumptions without evidence to support those
assumptions and upon court action that was not introduced into evidence by any party during the
hearing and the underlying facts were expressly ruled
by the Court to be inadmissable during the hearing.
ISSUE NO. 2

THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW ON THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ON THE
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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THREE ALLEGATIONS ACCEPTED AS TRUE
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS AN UNFIT
PARENT, THAT SUCH ALLEGATIONS WERE
SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE CHILD, OR
THAT APPELLANT COULD OR WOULD NOT
CHANGE THESE DEFECTS CAUSING HER
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO BE TERMINATED.
The Court in the Lance case, stated the law
and public policy consideration in termination of
parental rights clearly as follows:
"Deprivation of the parents' custody of
their children is a drastic remedy which should
be resorted to only in extreme cases and when
it is manifest that the home itself cannot or will
not correct the evils which exist. The cutting of
family ties is a step of utmost gravity and is
undesirable both socially and economically and
should be avoided unless that is the only
alternative to be found consistent with the best
interests of the children. There is a presumption that it is generally for the best interest and
welfare of children to be reared under the care
of their natural parents.
Under this
presumption the burden of persuading the trier
of the fact is always on the person who claims
that it will be for the best interests of the child
to be reared by someone other than the natural
parents of such child. To support a decision to
deprive the parent of its child the Court must
first be convinced of such fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The juvenile Court did not specifically state the
testimony or facts which proved to him that the State
had proven the three allegations he accepted as true:
but by careful review of the record, it is clear that no
such evidence or its importance by a preponderous
exists.
ALLEGATION ONE: Appellant had not acquired
the necessary skills to properly supervise and train
the said child. The question of supervision was
resolved in finding allegation four not true. All witnesses who testified on the child's alleged defects in
training were involved with the child after he had
been removed from his mother and familiar
surroundings. Those witnesses who dealt with the
appellant and the child prior to the termination
especially Mrs. McWhirter (p. 162-181) are clear that
the appellant had trained and supervised the child.
Mrs. McWhirter's position as a babysitter,
licensed and paid by the Division of Family Services,
who had Terry in her home every working day from
Feburary 5, 1973 to April 27, 1973 except for a few
days of sickness, is especially important. It should
be noted that during this time to June 19, 1973, the
Division of Family Services never contacted her about
Terry's adjustment during the period, (p. 171).
ALLEGATION TWO: Appellant's housekeeping
standards were so poor as to seriously jeopardize the
said child's physical and emotional health. Despite the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dispute of when some of the mess occurred (p. 91) the
Court rendered the problem moot by not placing much
emphasis on the problem (p. 316).
Mr. Morgan from the Division of Family Services
at the second hearing verified that the house was clean
during his visits after the Court order (p. 380).
ALLEGATION
THREE: Apellant's moral
standards are so low as to seriously damage the
morals and welfare of the child. Even accepting all the
adverse inferences against the appellant from the few
facts on the record and not accepting her explanations,
there is no evidence that this was a seriously
damaging influence on the said child. She denied ever
having sex even with her husband in front of the
children. If a woman's belief that sexual relations
with a man who is not her husband but with whom she
is planning marriage shows a person is unfit to care for
the child that may result therefrom, there would be
many children removed from homes especially from
young couples. The only witness on Mrs. Gullett's
reputation admitted her bias due to her present
husband's dating Mrs. Gullett between their divorce
and subsequent remarriage (p. 294).
Even accepting the allegations as true and that
they substantially damage the child, there is no
evidence on the record that the home cannot or will
not correct the evils which exist as required in Lance.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
The record shows that the appellant and the minor
child lived together from his birth until April 27, 1973.
Mr. Morgan claimed at the second hearing that his
agency had spent many hours with Mrs. Gullett but at
the first hearing he admitted there wasn't much done
with Mrs. Gullett in the last little while (p. 16). There
is nothing in the record of what was done, by whom,
and the appellant's response. This coupled with how
the case began with a false report that the child had
been abandoned and the babysitter had been forced to
come to the home, the police under the direction of Mr.
Morgan removed the child from the appellant's home.
The child was never returned to Mrs. Gullett nor was
she given any supportive assistance from the Division
of Family Services as ordered by the Court. Still she,
on her own, removed the other children from the
home, cleaned up the house, changed her conduct, and
even moved to Orem in an attempt to establish a new
life and home so that Terry could be returned to her.
She visited Terry every week and waited for Mr.
Morgan to help her after she requested Terry be
returned to her after the first hearing. This she was
able to do despite the prejudice against her without
any clear basis on the record as expressed by the
Division of Family Services. Her problem of lack of
schooling and intellect are overcome by her love for
Terry and willingness to do what she is told to do.
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ISSUE NO. 3
Did the Division of Family Services fail to comply
with the order of the Court and the purposes of the
Juvenile Court Act in failing to assist and provide the
appellant with the help and assistance to meet the
requirements set forth by the Court so that Terry
could be returned to his mother.
Section 55—10—63, UCA(1953) as amended, state
the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act:
"It is the purpose of this act to secure for
each child coming before the juvenile court
such care, guidance, and control, preferably in
his own home, as will serve his welfare and the
best interests of the state; to preserve and
strengthen family, ties whenever possible; to
secure for any child who is removed from his
home the care, guidance, and discipline
required to assist him to develop into a
responsible citizen to improve the conditions
and home environment responsible for his
delinquency; and, at the same time, to protect
the community and its individual citizens
against juvenile violence and juvenile law
breaking. To this end this act shall be liberally
construed."
The Court recognizing these purposes made as
part of the order that:
"We'll request, in fact, we'll order, the
Division of Family Services provide all appropropriate support services that may be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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indicated for Mrs. Gullett and give her every
opportunity to learn good housekeeping
practices, good parental practices, not to the
extent of overriding her, but to provide what
she might need to assist her in making the
changes in her life that would be necessary for
her to justify leaving Terry with her permanently."
The final Court order was prepared by the Court
and notice of its contents was given to the Division of
Family Services by sending a copy of a letter sent to
Bishop Maurice Welsh, Mrs. Gullett's LDS Bishop,
(ex. A) Despite this, Mr. Morgan admitted that
none of this was done, because of his pre—existing
prejudices against the appellant. Mrs. Gullett was
thus deprived the opportunity to acquire the skills and
training that the Court believed she needed before
allowing her to raise her son.

CONCLUSION
The Court in relying on the results of previous
judicial actions without having the full facts in
evidence before him and in the failure of the state to
prove Mrs. Gullett's actions were so substantially
harmful as to damage the child or to be incapable of
correction and to prove assistance to allow her to
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correct the alleged defects constitute reversible error
and this Court should dismiss the said petition or, in
the alternative, grant the appellant a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
HILLYARD & GUNNELL

Hillyard
by for Appellant
140 East Second North
Logan, Utah 84321

I hereby certify that I delivered copies of the
foregoing brief of appellant to the Utah
Attorney General's office this

day of

Oct. 1974.
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